Recent research has shown that the single-user security of optimistic fair exchange cannot guarantee the multi-user security. This paper investigates the conditions under which the security of optimistic fair exchange in the single-user setting is preserved in the multi-user setting. We first introduce and define a property called "Strong Resolution-Ambiguity". Then we prove that in the certified-key model, an optimistic fair exchange protocol is secure in the multi-user setting if it is secure in the single-user setting and has the property of strong resolutionambiguity. Finally we provide a new construction of optimistic fair exchange with strong resolution-ambiguity. The new protocol is setup-free, stand-alone and multi-user secure without random oracles.
Introduction
In a fair exchange protocol, two parties can exchange their items in a fair way so that no one can gain any advantage in the process. A simple way to realize fair exchange is to introduce an online trusted third party who acts as a mediator: earth party sends the item to the trusted third party, who upon verifying the correctness of both items, forwards each item to the other party. A drawback of this approach is that the trusted third party is always involved in the exchange even if both parties are honest and no fault occurs. In practice, the trusted third party could become a bottleneck of the system and is vulnerable to the denial-of-service attack.
Optimistic Fair Exchange (also known as off-line fair exchange) was introduced by Asokan et al. [1] . An optimistic fair exchange protocol also needs a third party called "arbitrator", who is not required to be online all the time. Instead, the arbitrator only gets invoked when something goes wrong (e.g., one party attempts to cheat or other faults occur). An optimistic fair exchange protocol involves three participants, namely the signer, the verifier and the arbitrator.
want to make in this paper. Dodis and Reyzin [11] proposed a stand-alone but setup-driven verifiably committed signature scheme from Gap Diffie-Hellman problem. Constructions of stand-alone and setup-free verifiably committed signature were proposed in [22, 23] .
Optimistic Fair Exchange in the Multi-user Setting
Recently the security of non-interactive optimistic fair exchange in the multiuser setting was independently studied in [10] and [24] . Optimistic fair exchange in the multi-user setting refers to the scenario where there are two or more signers in the system, but items are still exchanged between two parties. This is different from the multi-party exchange which considers the exchange among three or more parties.
In [10] , Dodis, Lee and Yum pointed out that the single-user security of optimistic fair exchange cannot guarantee the multi-user security. They presented a simple counterexample which is secure in the single-user setting but is insecure in a multi-user setting. (In the counterexample, a dishonest verifier in the multiuser setting can obtain a full signature without fulfilling the obligation.) Dodis, Lee and Yum defined the multi-user security model of optimistic fair exchange and provided a generic setup-free construction of optimistic fair exchange secure in the multi-user setting [10] . The security of their construction relies on one-way functions in the random oracle model and trapdoor one-way permutations in the standard model. The analysis in [10] shows that two well-known techniques of optimistic fair exchange (namely, constructions based on verifiably encrypted signatures and sequential two-party signatures) remain secure in the multi-user setting if the underlying primitives satisfy some security notions. Independently, Zhu, Susilo and Mu [24] also demonstrated a verifiably committed signature scheme which is secure in the model defined in [11] but is insecure in the multi-user setting. They defined the security notions of verifiably committed signature in the multi-user setting and proposed a concrete construction of multi-user secure stand-alone and setup-free verifiably committed signature [24] . The non-interactive version of their scheme uses the Fiat-Shamir technique and requires a hash function, which is viewed as the random oracle in security analysis. Due to [10] , multi-user secure stand-alone and setup-free optimistic fair exchange protocols without random oracles can be constructed from verifiably encrypted signature schemes without random oracles [15, 20, 18] .
Certified-Key Model and Chosen-Key Model
Most optimistic fair exchange protocols are considered in the certified-key model where the user must prove the knowledge of the private key at the key registration phase. Therefore, the adversary is only allowed to make queries about certified public keys. Huang et al. [14, 13] considered the multi-user security of optimistic fair exchange in the chosen-key model, where the adversary can make queries about public keys arbitrarily without requiring to show its knowledge of the corresponding private keys. Optimistic fair exchange protocols secure in the certified-key model may not be secure in the chosen-key model [14] .
Huang et al. [14] proposed another generic construction for optimistic fair exchange. Their construction can lead to efficient setup-free optimistic fair ex-change protocols secure in the standard model and the chosen-key model. Very recently, the first efficient ambiguous optimistic fair exchange protocol was proposed in [13] . The new protocol is proven secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model without relying on the random oracle assumption. Without any doubt, it is more desirable if cryptographic protocols can be proven secure in the chosen-key model. However, in this paper, the security of optimistic fair exchange is considered in the certified-key model (as defined in [10] ), since certified-key model is reasonable and has been widely used in the research of public key cryptography. In the remainder of this paper, when we say an optimistic fair exchange protocol is multi-user secure (or, secure in the multi-user setting), it refers that the protocol is secure in the multi-user setting defined in [10] (which is in the certified-key model).
Motivation
The research on optimistic fair exchange has shown that:
-The single-user security of optimistic fair exchange does not guarantee the multi-user security [10, 24] . -Not all single-user secure optimistic fair exchange protocols are insecure in the multi-user setting [10] . Several single-user secure protocols can be proven secure in the multi-user setting [10] .
However, it remains unknown under which conditions single-user secure optimistic fair exchange protocols will be secure in the multi-user setting? We believe the investigation of this question not only will provide a further understanding on the security of optimistic fair exchange in the multi-user setting, but also can introduce new constructions of multi-user secure optimistic fair exchange.
Our Contributions
This paper focuses on both theory investigations and new construction of optimistic fair exchange in the multi-user setting.
1. In Section 3, we introduce and define a new property of optimistic fair exchange, which we call Strong Resolution-Ambiguity. Briefly speaking, an optimistic fair exchange protocol has the property of strong resolution-ambiguity if one can transform a partial signature ′ into a full signature using signer's private key or arbitrator's private key, and given such a pair ( ′ , ), it is infeasible to tell which key is used in the conversion. While there are some optimistic fair exchange protocols satisfying strong resolution-ambiguity, it is the first time this notion is addressed and formally defined. 2. For an optimistic fair exchange protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity, we prove that its security in the single-user setting is preserved in the multiuser setting. More precisely, we show that: (1) the security against the signer and the security against the verifier in the single-user setting are preserved in the multi-user setting for optimistic fair exchange protocols with strong resolution-ambiguity, and (2) the security against the arbitrator in the singleuser setting is preserved in the multi-user setting (for optimistic fair exchange protocols either with or without strong resolution-ambiguity). While strong resolution-ambiguity is not a necessary property for (multiuser secure) optimistic fair exchange protocols, our result provides a new approach for the security analysis of optimistic fair exchange protocols in the multi-user setting: One only needs to analyze the security in the singleuser setting (rather than the more complex multi-user setting) for optimistic fair exchange protocols with strong resolution-ambiguity. 3. In Section 4, we provide a new construction of optimistic fair exchange with strong resolution-ambiguity. Our construction is a variant of the optimistic fair exchange protocol from the verifiably encrypted signature scheme proposed in [15] . The protocol in [15] has several desirable properties, e.g., setup-free, stand-alone and multi-user secure without random oracles under computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our protocol retains all these properties and is more efficient in generating, transmitting and verifying partial signatures. This however is achieved at the cost of larger key size.
Definitions of Optimistic Fair Exchange in the Multi-user Setting
This section reviews the syntax and security definitions of optimistic fair exchange in the multi-user setting [10] .
Syntax of Optimistic Fair Exchange
A setup-free non-interactive optimistic fair exchange protocol involves three parties: the signer, the verifier and the arbitrator. It is defined by the following efficient algorithms. An algorithm is called efficient if it is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine.
-Setup TTP . The arbitrator setup algorithm takes as input a parameter Param, and gives as output a secret arbitration key ASK and a public partial verification key APK. -Setup User . The user setup algorithm takes as input Param and (optionally) APK, and gives as output a private signing key SK and a public verification key PK. -Sig and Ver. These are similar to signing and verification algorithms in an ordinary digital signature scheme.
• The signing algorithm Sig, run by a signer , takes as input ( , SK , APK) and gives as output a signature on the message . In fair exchange protocols, signatures generated by Sig are called as full signatures.
• The verification algorithm Ver, run by a verifier, takes as input ( , , PK , APK) and returns valid or invalid. A signature is said to be a valid full signature of under PK if Ver( , , PK , APK) = valid. -PSig and PVer. These are partial signing and verification algorithms, where
PSig together with Res (which will be defined soon) are functionally equivalent to Sig.
• The partial signing algorithm PSig, run by a signer , takes as input ( , SK , APK) and gives as output a signature ′ on . To distinguish from those produced by Sig, signatures generated by PSig are called as partial signatures. • The partial verification algorithm PVer, run by a verifier, takes as input ( , ′ , PK , APK) and returns valid or invalid. A signature ′ is said to be a valid partial signature of under PK if PVer( , ′ , PK , APK) = valid. -Res. The resolution algorithm Res takes as input a valid partial signature ′ of under PK and the secret arbitration key ASK, and gives as output a signature . This algorithm is run by the arbitrator for a party , who does not receive the full signature from , but possesses a valid partial signature of and a proof that he/she has fulfilled the obligation to .
Correctness. If each signature is generated according to the protocol specification, then it should pass the corresponding verification algorithms. Namely,
3. Ver( , Res( , PSig( , SK , APK), ASK, PK ), PK , APK) = valid.
Resolution-Ambiguity [10, 11, 14, 16, 24] . Any "resolved signature" Res( , PSig ( , SK , APK), ASK, PK ) is (at least computationally) indistinguishable from the "actual signature" Sig( , SK , APK).
Security of Optimistic Fair Exchange. Intuitively, the fairness of an exchange requires that two parties exchange their items in a fair way so that either each party obtains the other's item or neither party does. This requirement consists of the security against signer(s), the security against verifier(s) and the security against the arbitrator, which will be defined by the game between the adversary and the challenger. During the game, the challenger will maintain three initially empty lists: (1) -contains the public keys of created users; (2) -contains the partial signing queries made by the adversary; and (3) contains the resolution queries made by the adversary. The definitions in the following sections are inspired by those in [10] , with modifications which we believe can demonstrate the difference between the singleuser security and the multi-user security of optimistic fair exchange.
Security against Signer(s)
In an optimistic fair exchange protocol, the signer should not be able to generate a valid partial signature which cannot be converted into a valid full signature by the arbitrator. This property is defined by the following game.
-Setup. The challenger generates the parameter Param and the arbitrator's key pair (APK, ASK) by running Setup TTP . The adversary is given Param and APK. -Queries. Proceeding adaptively, can make following queries.
Creating-User-Queries. can create a user by making a creating-user query ( , PK ). In order to convince the challenger to accept PK (i.e., add PK to the -), must prove its knowledge of the legitimate private key SK . This can be realized by requiring the adversary to hand over the private key as suggested in [15] , or generate a proof of knowledge [4] of the private key 1 . Resolution-Queries. For a resolution-query ( , ′ , PK) satisfying PVer( , ′ , PK, APK) = valid, the challenger first browses -. If PK / ∈ -, an error symbol "⊤" will be returned to the adversary. Otherwise, the challenger adds ( , PK) to the -(if the pair ( , PK) is not there) and responds with an output of Res( , ′ , ASK, PK).
-Output. Eventually, outputs a triple ( , ′ , PK * ) and wins the game if PK * ∈ -, PVer( , ′ , PK * , APK) = valid, and Ver( , Res( , ′ , ASK, PK * ), PK * , APK) = invalid.
Let Adv OFE be the probability that wins in the above game, taken over the coin tosses made by and the challenger. An adversary is said to ( , , , )-break the security against signer(s) if in time , makes at most Creating-User-Queries, Resolution-Queries and Adv OFE is at least .
Definition 1 (Security against Signer(s)
). An optimistic fair exchange protocol is ( , , , )-secure against signer(s) if no adversary ( , , , )-breaks it.
By setting = 1, we can define the security against the signer in the singleuser setting, namely an optimistic fair exchange protocol is ( , , )-secure against the signer in the single-user setting if no adversary ( , 1, , )-breaks it.
Security against Verifier(s)
Briefly speaking, the security against verifier(s) requires that the verifier should not be able to generate a valid partial signature of a new message or generate a valid full signature without the assistance from the signer or the arbitrator.
The first requirement is ensured by the security against the arbitrator, namely even the arbitrator (knowing more than the verifier) cannot succeed in that attack. This will be defined shortly in Section 2.4. The second requirement is defined as below.
-Setup. The challenger generates the parameter Param and the arbitrator's key pair (APK, ASK) by running Setup TTP . The challenger also generates a key pair (PK * , SK * ) by running Setup User , and adds PK * to -. The adversary ℬ is given Param, APK and PK * .
-Queries. Proceeding adaptively, ℬ can make all queries defined in Section 2.2 and Partial-Signing-Queries defined as follows. Partial-Signing-Queries. For a partial-signing query ( , PK * ), the challenger responds with an output of PSig( , SK * , APK). After that, ( , PK * ) is added to the -. (ℬ is allowed to make Partial-Signing-Queries only about PK * as other public keys are created by ℬ.) -Output. Eventually, ℬ outputs a pair ( , ) and wins the game if ( , PK * ) / ∈ -and Ver( , , PK * , APK) = valid.
Let Adv OFE ℬ be the probability that ℬ wins in the above game, taken over the coin tosses made by ℬ and the challenger. An adversary ℬ is said to ( , , , , )-break the security against verifier(s) if in time , ℬ makes at most Creating-User-Queries, Partial-Signing-Queries, Resolution-Queries and Adv OFE ℬ is at least . Similarly, we can obtain the definition of the security against the verifier in the single-user setting, namely an optimistic fair exchange protocol is ( , , , )secure against the verifier in the single-user setting if no adversary ( , 0, , , )breaks it.
Security against the Arbitrator
In this section, we will define the security against the arbitrator and prove that the security against the arbitrator in the single-user setting is preserved in the multi-user setting.
The security against the arbitrator requires that the arbitrator, without the partial signature on a message , should not be able to produce a valid full signature on 2 . This notion is defined as follows.
-Setup. The challenger generates the parameter Param, which is given to the adversary . Let Adv OFE be the probability that wins in the above game, taken over the coin tosses made by and the challenger. An adversary is said to ( , , , )break the security against the arbitrator if in time , makes at most Creating-User-Queries, Partial-Signing-Queries and Adv OFE is at least .
Remark 1. In the game, the adversary must first generate the arbitrator's public key APK before obtaining PK * or making other queries. This reflects the definition of optimistic fair exchange as APK could be an input of algorithms Setup User and PSig. For concrete protocols where these algorithms do not require APK as the input, the adversary can obtain PK * and/or make partial-signing-queries of PK * before generating APK.
Definition 3 (Security against the Arbitrator). An optimistic fair exchange protocol is ( , , , )-secure against the arbitrator in the multi-user setting if no adversary ( , , , )-breaks it.
We can obtain the definition of the security against the arbitrator in the singleuser setting, namely an optimistic fair exchange protocol is ( , , )-secure against the arbitrator in the single-user setting if no adversary ( , 0, , )breaks it. The following theorem shows that the security against the arbitrator in the single-user setting is preserved in the multi-user setting. Theorem 1. An optimistic fair exchange protocol is ( , , , )-secure against the arbitrator in the multi-user setting if it is ( + 1 , , )-secure against the arbitrator in the single-user setting. Here, 1 denotes the time unit to respond to one creating-user query.
Proof. We denote by the adversary in the single-user setting and in the multi-user setting. We will show how to convert a successful to a successful . At the beginning, obtains Param from its challenger in the single-user setting.
-Setup. Param is given to . -Output-I. Let APK be the arbitrator's public key created by in the multi-user setting. APK will be sent to 's challenger in the single-user setting.
will make use of to generate a proof of knowledge, namely will act as a relay in the proof by forwarding all messages from its challenger to (or, from to its challenger). At the end of this phase, will be given a public key PK * , which will be forwarded to as its challenging public key in the multi-user setting.
-Queries. We show how can correctly answer 's queries. Creating-User-Queries. For a creating-user query ( , PK ), will add PK to -if can generate a proof of knowledge of the legitimate private key. Partial-Signing-Queries. For a partial-signing query ( , PK * ), forwards it to its own challenger and sends the response to . -Output-II. Eventually, will output a pair ( , ). will set ( , ) as its own output in the single-user setting.
will win the game in the single-user setting if wins the game in the multi-user setting. It follows that the success probability of will be if can ( , , , )-break the security against the arbitrator in the multi-user setting.
It remains to show the time consumption in the proof. 's running time is the same as 's running time plus the time it takes to answer creating-userqueries, which we assume each query takes time at most 1 . Therefore, the total time consumption is + 1 . We have shown that for an optimistic fair exchange protocol, if there is an adversary ( , , , )-breaks the security against the arbitrator in the multiuser setting, then there is an adversary ( + 1 , , )-breaks the security against the arbitrator in the single-user setting. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. □ Section 3 will investigate the conditions under which the security against the signer and the security against the verifier in the single-user setting will remain in the multi-user setting.
Strong Resolution-Ambiguity
This section investigates a new property of optimistic fair exchange, which we call "Strong Resolution-Ambiguity". We will give the definition of strong resolution-ambiguity and prove that for optimistic fair exchange protocols with that property, the security against the signer and the security against the verifier in the single-user setting are preserved in the multi-user setting. Before giving the formal definition, we first review a generic construction of optimistic fair exchange [11] .
Optimistic Fair Exchange from Sequential Two-Party Multisignature A multisignature scheme allows any subgroup of users to jointly sign a document such that a verifier is convinced that each user of the subgroup participated in the signing. To construct an optimistic fair exchange protocol, one can use a simple type of multisignature, which is called sequential two-party multisignature. In this construction, the signer first generates two key pairs ( , ) and (APK, ASK), where ( , APK, ASK) are sent to the arbitrator through a secured channel. The signer's private key SK is the pair ( , ASK) and the arbitrator's private key is ASK. The partial signature ′ of a message is an ordinary signature generated using , and the full signature is the multisignature generated using ′ and ASK. Given a valid partial signature, both the arbitrator and the signer can convert it to a full signature using ASK. (Recall that ASK is the arbitrator's private key and part of the signer's private key.) It is thus virtually infeasible to tell who (the signer or the arbitrator) converted the partial signature to the full signature. This is the essential requirement of optimistic fair exchange with strong resolution-ambiguity, which is formally defined as follows.
Definition of Strong Resolution-Ambiguity
We first introduce a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Convert which allows the signer to convert a partial signature to a full one. The definition of Convert is given as below.
-Convert. This algorithm takes as input the signer's private key SK , (optionally) arbitrator's public key APK, a message and its valid partial signature ′ . The output is the signer's full signature on .
In a trivial case, each optimistic fair exchange protocol has an algorithm Convert = Sig. (In this case the full signature generated by Convert could be totally independent of the partial signature.) Our interest here is to investigate non-trivial Convert and compare it with the resolution algorithm Res. Recall that, with the knowledge of ASK, one can also convert a partial signature to a full one using Res. This makes the following question interesting: Given a valid partial signature ′ , what are the differences between full signatures produced by Convert and those produced by Res? The answer to this question inspires the definition of strong resolution-ambiguity.
To formally define the strong resolution-ambiguity, we assume the arbitrator's key pair satisfies an NP-relation TTP , and users' key pairs satisfy another NPrelation U . An NP-relation is a subset of {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * for which there exists a polynomial such that | | ≤ (| |) for all ( , ) ∈ , and there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for deciding membership in .
In an optimistic fair exchange protocol defined in Section 2, let (APK, ASK) be any pair in TTP , and let (PK , SK ) be any pair in U . For any pair ( , ′ ) satisfying PVer( , ′ , PK , APK) = valid, we define
Convert : probability distribution of full signatures produced by Convert( , ′ , SK , APK).
( , ′ ) Res : probability distribution of full signatures produced by Res( , ′ , PK , ASK).
Definition 4 (Strong Resolution-Ambiguity
). An optimistic fair exchange protocol is said to satisfy strong resolution-ambiguity if there exists an algorithm Convert as defined above such that
Strong Resolution-Ambiguity and Resolution-Ambiguity: A Brief Comparison
An optimistic fair exchange protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity will satisfy resolution-ambiguity if Sig is defined as (PSig + Convert), namely the signer first generates a partial signature and then converts it to a full one using Convert. In this case, actual signatures (generated by Sig) are indistinguishable from resolved signatures (generated by Res). However, resolution-ambiguity cannot ensure strong resolution-ambiguity which requires that one can use the signer's private key to convert a partial signature to a full one and the conversion is indistinguishable from that using the arbitrator's private key.
Optimistic Fair Exchange Protocols with/without Strong Resolution-Ambiguity
It is evident that the generic construction of optimistic fair exchange from sequential two-party multisignature [11] (reviewed at the beginning of Section 3) has the strong resolution-ambiguity property by defining Convert = Res. Below are some other concrete examples of optimistic fair exchange with/without strong resolution-ambiguity.
Optimistic Fair Exchange from Verifiably Encrypted Signatures
Let OFE-VES be optimistic fair exchange protocols constructed from verifiably encrypted signatures. If the algorithm Sig is deterministic (e.g., the verifiably encrypted signature scheme in [8] ), then OFE-VES will have the strong resolutionambiguity property. For any valid partial signature of , there is only one output of the algorithm Res, namely the unique full signature of . By defining Convert = Sig,
Convert and ( , ′ ) Res will be identical and the protocols satisfy strong resolution-ambiguity. OFE-VES with probabilistic Sig algorithms could also have the strong resolution-ambiguity property. One example is the optimistic fair exchange protocol from the verifiably encrypted signature scheme proposed in [15] . In [15] , the Sig algorithm is the signing algorithm in Waters signature [19] , and the partial signature ′ is the encryption of the full signature using APK. After extracting from ′ , the arbitrator will randomize such that the output of Res is a full signature uniformly distributed in the full signature space. This makes the distribution of full signatures produced by Res the same as that of full signatures generated by Convert = Sig.
A Concrete Instance of the Generic Construction in [14] The generic construction of optimistic fair exchange in [14] is based on a conventional signature scheme and a ring signature scheme, both of which can be constructed efficiently without random oracles. In the protocol, the signer and the arbitrator first generate their own key pairs. The full signature of a message is a pair ( 1 , 2 ), where 1 is the signer's conventional signature on the message , and 2 is a ring-signature on and 1 . Either the signer or the arbitrator is able to generate 2 . This construction will satisfy strong resolution-ambiguity if the distribution of ring signatures generated by the signer is the same as that of ring signatures generated by the arbitrator (e.g., 2-User ring signature scheme without random oracles [5] ).
A Concrete Protocol without Strong Resolution-Ambiguity
One example of optimistic fair exchange protocols without strong resolutionambiguity is the single-user secure but multi-user insecure optimistic fair exchange protocol proposed in [10] . In this protocol, the full signature of a message is = ( , ), where is the signer's conventional signature on " ∥ ", = ( ), and is a trapdoor one-way permutation. The partial signature is defined as ′ = ( , ). To convert ( , ) to a full signature, the arbitrator uses his/her private key −1 to compute = −1 ( ) and obtain the full signature ( , ). Given a message and its full signature ( , ), it is hard to tell if ( , ) is produced by Sig directly, or first generated by PSig and then by Res. Thus, as shown in [10] , the property "resolution-ambiguity" is satisfied. On the other hand, this protocol does not have strong resolution-ambiguity as is a trapdoor one-way permutation. Suppose, otherwise, there is an algorithm Convert such that for a partial signature ′ , the outputs of Convert( , ′ , SK , ) have the same probability distribution as those of Res( , ′ , PK , −1 ). Note that for ′ = ( , ), Res will output a pair ( , ) such that = ( ). It follows that Convert( , ′ , SK , ) must also output ( , ) satisfying = ( ) if the protocol has strong resolution-ambiguity. This breaks the one-wayness of , namely given , there is an efficient algorithm Convert which can find such that ( ) = without the trapdoor −1 .
Notice that given a partial signature ′ , the signer can generate a full signature such that is indistinguishable from the one converted by the arbitrator. To do that, the signer needs to maintain a list {( , ) : = ( )} when he/she produces the partial signature ′ = ( , ). Later on, for a partial signature ( , ), the signer can search the list and find the matching pair ( , ). In this case, the signer can generate a full signature ( , ) which is indistinguishable from the one converted by the resolution algorithm Res. However, this approach does not satisfy the definition of Convert since it requires an additional input . (Recall that the inputs of Convert are only SK , ( , ′ ) and APK.)
Security of Optimistic Fair Exchange Protocols with Strong
Resolution-Ambiguity Theorem 1 has shown that the security against the arbitrator in the single-user setting is preserved in the multi-user setting. This section considers the other two security notions, and we will prove that:
1. For optimistic fair exchange protocols with strong resolution-ambiguity, the security against the signer in the single-user setting remains in the multi-user setting (Theorem 2). 2. For optimistic fair exchange protocols with strong resolution-ambiguity, the security against the verifier in the single-user setting remains in the multiuser setting (Theorem 3).
Theorem 2. An optimistic fair exchange protocol with strong resolution ambiguity is ( , , , )-secure against signers in the multi-user setting, if it is ( + 1 + 2 , , / )-secure against the singer in the single-user setting. Here, 1 is the time unit depends on the validity of the proof of knowledge and 2 is the time unit depends on the algorithm Convert in the protocol. Proof. We denote by the adversary in the single-user setting and in the multi-user setting. In the proof, we use the standard method by showing that for an optimistic fair exchange protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity, a successful can be converted into a successful . We first give a high-level description of the proof.
will act as the challenger of in the proof and answer all queries from the latter.
will set the challenging public key PK * of as its own challenging public key, and set 's output as its own output. The most difficult part in the proof is how can correctly answer resolution queries from . For resolution queries related to PK * , can use its own challenger to generate correct responses. However, this is not feasible for resolution queries about other public keys (since 's challenger only responds to queries about PK * ). Fortunately, such queries can be correctly answered by if the optimistic fair exchange protocol has strong resolution-ambiguity. For a resolution query ( , ′ , PK ), can convert ′ to a full signature using the algorithm Convert and the private key SK . Due to Def. 4, this perfectly simulates the real game between and the challenger in the multi-user setting. The private key SK can be extracted by due to the validity of the proof of knowledge required in the creating-user phase.
The details of the proof appear in the full version of this paper. □ Theorem 3. An optimistic fair exchange protocol with strong resolution ambiguity is ( , , , , )-secure against verifiers in the multi-user setting, if it is ( + 1 + 2 , , , )-secure against the verifier in the single-user setting. Here, 1 is the time unit depends on the validity of the proof of knowledge and 2 is the time unit depends on the algorithm Convert in the protocol.
Proof. The details of the proof appear in the full version of this paper.
Remark 2. Our analysis only shows that strong resolution-ambiguity is a sufficient condition for single-user secure optimistic fair exchange protocols remaining secure in the multi-user setting. It is not a necessary property for (multi-user secure) optimistic fair exchange protocols.
A New Optimistic Fair Exchange Protocol with Strong Resolution-Ambiguity
A new optimistic fair exchange protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity is proposed in this section. The protocol is based on Waters signature [19] from bilinear mappings. Definitions of bilinear mappings and computational Diffie-Hellman assumption can be found in [19] .
The Proposed Protocol
Let ( , ) be bilinear groups of prime order and let be a generator of . denotes the bilinear mapping × → . Let be the bit-string length of the message to be signed. For an element in {0, 1} , let ℳ ⊆ {1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , } be the set of all for which the ℎ bit is 1. The parameter Param is ( , , , , , ). Analysis of Our Protocol. It is evident that our protocol is setup-free and stand-alone. We show that it also satisfies strong resolution-ambiguity. One can find an algorithm Convert, which is the same as Sig, such that given any partial signature ′ , the outputs of Convert are indistinguishable from those produced by Res, both of which are uniformly distributed in the valid signature space of Waters signature. Thus, the proposed protocol also satisfies strong resolution-ambiguity.
The following theorem shows that the protocol is secure in the multi-user setting.
Theorem 4. The proposed protocol is multi-user secure under computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Proof. The details of the proof appear in the full version of this paper. □
Comparison to Previous Protocols
Table. 1 compares the known optimistic fair exchange protocols which have the same properties as the newly proposed one (namely, non-interactive, setup-free, stand-alone and multi-user secure without random oracles). The comparison is made from the following aspects: (1) underlying complexity assumption, (2) partial signature size and full signature size, and (3) the computational cost of signing and verifying partial signatures and full signatures. We consider the cost of signing and verifying partial signatures since the signer must generate a partial signature in each exchange, which will be verified by the verifier and could also be checked again by the arbitrator. Therefore, the efficiency of signing and verifying partial signatures is at least as important as that of full signatures. Notations. CDH: Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. CT-CDH: Chosen-target computational Diffie-Hellman assumption [6] . SDH: Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. | |: bit length of an element in , |Z Z |: bit length of an element in Z Z . C W : Computational cost of generating one Waters signature [19] . C BB : Computational cost of generating one BB signature [7] . : Exponentiation in , Exp : Pre-computable exponentiation in . : Bilinear mapping, BM: Pre-computable bilinear mapping.
In Table. 1, the most efficient one is the protocol constructed from the verifiably encrypted signature scheme in [18] , whose security assumption is strong Diffie-Hellman assumption (SDH). The other three protocols are all based on Waters signature, but the security of the protocol in [20] can only be reduced to a stronger assumption: chosen-target computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (CT-CDH). Our protocol and the one proposed in [15] are designed in a similar manner. When compared with [15] , our protocol has a shorter partial signature size and is more efficient in signing and verifying partial signatures. This is achieved at the cost of larger key size (one more pair ( , ) in Z Z × ).
Conclusion
This paper shows several new results about optimistic fair exchange in the multiuser setting. We formally defined the Strong Resolution-Ambiguity in optimistic fair exchange and demonstrated several concrete optimistic fair exchange protocols with that property. In the certified-key model, we prove that for optimistic fair exchange protocols with strong resolution-ambiguity, the security in the single-user setting can guarantee the security in the multi-user setting. In addition to theoretical investigations, a new construction of optimistic fair exchange with strong resolution-ambiguity was proposed. The new protocol is setup-free, stand-alone, and provably secure in the multi-user setting without random oracles.
